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NOTES
Ancillary Jurisdiction and Intervention Under
Federal Rule 24: Analysis and Proposals
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow certain parties to intervene
in actions pending in the United States district courts.' Intervenors are
divided by rule 24 into two classes, intervenors of right and permissive
intervenors.2 Briefly, a party is entitled to intervention of right when a
statute of the United States confers upon him an unconditional right to
intervene, or where a party not already adequately represented claims
an interest in the subject of the action, and the ability to protect that
interest could, as a practical matter, be impaired by a disposition of the
action. Permissive intervention is available, at the discretion of the district
court, where a conditional right to intervene is conferred by a United
States statute, or where the intervenor would present a claim or defense
which has a question of law or fact in common with the main action.3It is axiomatic that a procedural rule, such as rule 24, cannot by its
own force lend subject matter jurisdiction to a federal district court to
hear a given dispute." Accordingly, intervenors of both classes must show
FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b).
Rule 24 reads in part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon a timely application anyone shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an in-
terest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the ac-
tion and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the appli-
cant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
O wen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941); FED. R. Civ. P. 82. Although nearly everyone regards this proposi-
tion as true, its exact basis is unclear. The language of rule 82 is clear: "These rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States District courts
.... "FED. R. Civ. P. 82. It is uncertain, however, whether this rule was required by either
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), or the separation of powers doctrine, or
whether it is a self-imposed limitation, manifesting an attitude of judicial restraint. The
Rules Enabling Act expressly provides that the rules are not to "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). But the line between procedure and substance
is not easy to discern. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). The 100-mile bulge provision of rule 4 for personal jurisdiction
has been upheld as within the mandate of the Rules Enabling Act, and by implication,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
themselves to be within the jurisdiction of the district court before they
can utilize the procedure of rule 24 intervention.' In intervention of right
the jurisdictional problem is academic, for it has consistently been held
that intervention of right need not be supported by an independent basis
of jurisdiction.8 The better statement of this rule is that such intervenors
need not show independent jurisdiction because they invariably fall within
the ancillary jurisdiction of the district court.7 However, when the in-
tervention is permissive, the majority of the cases, and most commen-
tators, state that ancillary jurisdiction may never be relied upon; a per-
missive intervenor must show an independent basis of jurisdiction.'
This note explores the reasoning behind this disparate treatment of
the two types of intervenors, and argues that in certain cases ancillary
jurisdiction is appropriate for permissive intervention as well as
intervention of right. In particular, the cases that border on the division
between the two types of intervention, but fall just short of intervention
procedural. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1968);
Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63, 67, 68 (D. Md. 1969). The Constitution
grants Congress the power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts, U.S. CONST.
art. I, S 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 1, but it is unclear whether Congress can delegate this power;
thus, it is possible that a judicially promulgated rule that expanded federal jurisdiction
might violate the separation of powers doctrine. One writer has concluded that neither
the Constitution nor the Rules Enabling Act mandates rule 82, and that the rule is merely
a statement of general policy which should not be overly rigid in its application. Goldberg,
The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 431-43
(1976). For a discussion of rule 82, ancillary jurisdiction, and intervention, see infra notes
186-201 and accompanying text.
- 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.1811] (2d ed. 1979); 7A C. WRIGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1917 (1972).
1 See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977); Warren G. Kleban Eng'g Corp.
v. Caldwell, 490 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir. 1970); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970); Formulabs,
Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 (1963); 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER supra note 5.
3B J. MOORE, supra note 5; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons
Whose Interest May be Impaired if Not Joined, 62 F.R.D. 483 (1974).
8 E.g., Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1979); Blake
v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977); Francis v. Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, 481 F2d 192 (4th Cir. 1973); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531
(8th Cir. 1970); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 5; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5. According
to most sources, the general contours of ancillary jurisdiction intervention conform to the
division between intervenors of right and permissive intervenors. But this general rule
has several exceptions and qualifications. Where permissive intervention is based on a
conditional right conferred by statute pursuant to rule 24(b)(1), the intervenor need not
show independent jurisdiction, as such statutes are read to confer jurisdiction. 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 5; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. supra, note 5, at 593; Campbell, Jurisdiction
and Venue Aspects of Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 7 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1940). Addi-
tionally, permissive intervention in in rem actions may rely on ancillary jurisdiction because
the res in court custody provides the nexus requisite for ancillary jurisdiction. 3B J. MOORE,
supra note 5; see also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. Finally, it has been said
that permissive intervention into a class action may be had without a showing of indepen-
dent jurisdiction. 3B J. MooRE, supra note 5. The area of controversy thus devolves to a per-
missive intervention sought in an in personam action (other than a class action) based upon
a claim or defense having a legal or factual question in common with the initial action.
[Vol. 58:111
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of right, are permissive interventions over which a federal district court
will often have ancillary jurisdiction. While not all permissive interven-
tions will meet the requirements of ancillary jurisdiction, this is no reason
to apply a rigid and absolute rule denying ancillary jurisdiction to all per-
missive intervenors.' Moreover, recognition of ancillary jurisdiction over
permissive intervention will serve important procedural policies by making
possible a more frequent use of discretionary permissive intervention.
The specific problem presented here is one facet of a much larger
problem: the tension inherent in a system where courts of limited
jurisdiction"0 use liberal procedural rules for the joinder of claims and
parties." Procedural mechanisms such as counterclaims, 2 cross-claims, 3
impleader," joinder of parties," and joinder of claims and remedies" serve
I Not all cases that have considered the availability of ancillary jurisdiction to per-
missive intervenors agree with the majority rule. See Northeast Clackamas County Elec.
Coop. v. Continental Casualty, 221 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1955); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n
v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Usery v. Brandel, 87
F.R.D. 670 (W.D. Mich. 1980); TPI Corp. v. Merchandise Mart, 61 F.R.D. 684 (D.S.C. 1974);
United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); De Korwin v.
First Nat'l Bank, 94 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1950). Another case, Berman v. Herrick, 30
F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1962), also flouted the general rule. Unfortunately, its author, Judge
Luongo, was led to retract his views on jurisdiction in intervention in a later case, Olivieri
v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The retraction was encouraged by a less than
charitable reception of the Bernan opinion in Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Intervention-
Jurisdictional Requirements, 48 IowA L. REv. 530 (1963). Professor Kennedy thought this se-
quence of events was "unfortunate." Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal
Rule 24, 57 KY.L.J. 329,376 n.170 (1969). Several other commentators agree that permissive
intervention should be broadened. Professor Shapiro finds these limitations on the use
of ancillary jurisdiction "needlessly restrictive." Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention
Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721,760 (1968). Moore apparent-
ly feels that it would be fortuitous from a policy standpoint were Congress to provide
jurisdiction for permissive intervenors, but that it is beyond judicial competence to achieve
the same result through the use of ancillary jurisdiction. 3B J. MOORE, supra note 5, at
24-200.
It is worth noting that cases allowing ancillary jurisdiction to permissive intervenors
occur almost entirely at the district court level. It is possible to draw two different in-
ferences from this: that the district court cases are wrong because district court judges
are prone to error and aberration; or that the district court cases are correct because trial
judges are more likely to reevaluate jurisdictional dogma to meet pressing practical con-
cerns of procedure. This note supports the latter inference. See infra notes 247-63 and
accompanying text. But ef. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a New
Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 894, 894-95, 924-27 (1980) (advocating in-
tervention practice with increased discretion in district courts and concomitant decrease
in appellate review).
10 There are two sources of restraint imposed upon federal jurisdiction: the Constitu-
tion itself, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; and the power the Constitution bestows upon Con-
gress to further regulate the judiciary, see id. art I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 1; see also Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (construing congressionally im-
posed limits in the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 12-16.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
I' d.
Id. RULE 14.
"Id. RULES 19, 20.
"Id. RULE 18.
1982]
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the interests of judicial economy and convenience." As the Supreme Court
has said, "[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."'" Yet the
effectiveness of these provisions is limited by the jurisdiction of the courts
that employ them.'9 The problem of ancillary jurisdiction is to reconcile
the need for procedural convenience with the jurisdictional limits of the
federal courts.0 The specific context of the pervasive tension that is
presented here is permissive intervention. The first part of this note
provides an overview of intervention practice and rule 24. The second
part sketches the contours of ancillary jurisdiction and the theories that
underly it." The third part synthesizes the two preceding parts by
applying an ancillary jurisdiction analysis to permissive intervention, and
discusses the policy implications of hearing permissive interventions under
the umbrella of ancillary jurisdiction.
AN OVERVIEW OF INTERVENTION AND FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24
History of Intervention
Intervention is by no means a recent innovation. The practice of allowing
1 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 991-92 (1958). See generally FED. R. Civ.
P. 1 (the rules to "be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action").
* UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
19 See supra note 10.
"See, Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of the United States District Courts,
10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 279, 281, 296 (1976). Properly conceived, ancillary jurisdiction is not
an identifiable set of doctrines, but merely the resolution of this tension; it is a shifting
line which marks the present reconciliation of practical needs with imperatives of jurisdiction:
The word "ancillary" . . should be used in a conclusory sense. If... a claim
is part of the transaction that is the basis of the pending action and its joinder
will further the administration of justice, it is appropriate to say that it comes
within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court.
Fraser, supra note 7, at 486 (emphasis added); see also 1 J. MOORE, supra note 5, 0.60
at 604 ("[Tihe Rules have functioned quite well because the courts ... have adopted and
utilized the old and well established principles of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction so that
independent jurisdictional grounds are not needed for the adjudication of a great many
of these claims.").
1 For the purposes of this note, the term "ancillary jurisdiction" is used in a broad
sense. That is, it is used to refer to any situation where a federal court hears a claim
falling outside expressly conferred federal jurisdiction, doing so because the claim is factually
or legally integrated with a claim within express federal jurisdiction. The term is in con-
tradistinction to independent jurisdiction, which means simply the jurisdiction of the federal
courts as expressly defined by the Constitution and Congress. Ancillary and independent
jurisdiction may be further distinguished in that the latter arises directly from constitu-
tional and legislative sources, but the former is judicially conferred. Of course the ultimate
analysis concludes, not without some tautology, that all jurisdiction exercised by the federal
[Vol. 58:111
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a nonparty to enter an action was known to Roman law.' Modern civil
law jurisdictions have continued the practice in a more limited scope.'
The ecclesiastical courts brought the practice into the common law,' and
eventually equity courts recognized a practice known as an examination
pro interesse suo, which allowed a nonparty to intervene to protect an
interest in property in the control of a court." In this country the practice
was recognized early in in rem admiralty actions.26
courts is rooted in the Constitution, because those courts, as final arbiters of the Constitu-
tion, must inevitably act pursuant to the Constitution. Thus, the term "express jurisdic-
tion" is perhaps the most appropriate term of contrast to ancillary jurisdiction, since the
only real distinction is that the former is expressly stated and the latter is not.
This use of the term ancillary jurisdiction departs from traditional usage, where ancillary
jurisdiction referred to a claim that is an integral part of a case or controversy considered
as an entirety, which claim the federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction over, if they have
jurisdiction over the case or controversy. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
§ 9 (3d ed. 1976). The term "pendent jurisdiction" was used to refer to the jurisdiction
to hear a nonfederal claim which was sufficiently related to a federal law claim so as to
be "pendent" to it. See C. WRIGHT, supra, § 19, at 75. Some cases have allowed permissive
intervention without independent jurisdiction under the rubric of "pendent party" jurisdic-
tion. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198,
213 (S.D. Tex. 1982); United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). This terminology has been avoided in this note for the sake of clarity. As used here,
ancillary jurisdiction refers to all of the above situations. This is justified because both
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction refer to the same problem: a claim beyond express jurisdic-
tion being heard because of its connection to a claim over which the court has express
jurisdiction. Although the two terms are historically distinct, they are at present almost
indistinguishable. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdic-
tion, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 759,762 n.24 (1972) (pendent jurisdiction a "subspecies" of ancillary
jurisdiction); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Synthesis of the Two
Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263 (1975). Cf. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("Gibbs [pendent jurisdiction] and this case [ancillary jurisdiction] are
two species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court
hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?") (footnote
omitted). Further justification for running ancillary and pendent jurisdiction together is
that the "common nucleus of operative fact" test laid out in UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), for pendent jurisdiction was assumed without decision to be applicable to the an-
cillary contexts in Kroger. 437 U.S. at 371 n.10. Accord Revere Copper & Brass v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1970) (test for ancillary jurisdiction is "logical
relationship to the aggregate core of operative facts"). It is fair to say that the Gibbs and
Revere tests differ only as to formulation. See Comment, Federal Procedure-Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-Ancillary Jurisdiction and Third-Party Practice-Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 396, 410-11 (1979). Thus, at least as to the
question of article III judicial power, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are all but iden-
tical. Still, this note maintains the distinction in terminology where it is useful for historical
purposes, and analytic differences are noted insofar as they remain relevant.
I Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention-The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45
YALE L.J. 565, 568 (1936). The exact scope of intervention practice in Roman law is un-
known. Id.3B J. MOORE, supra note 5, 24.03, at 24-42.
UId.
Id. at 24-43; see also the brief history of intervention in Cascade Natural Gas v. El
Paso Natural Gas, 386 U.S. 129, 144-45 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I See, e.g., Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4 (1834). Justice Story found the proceedings
below "irregular" only in that the owners of goods on a ship the subject of a libel action
had "interposed" the claims of several owners, without distinguishing their respective pro-
prietary interests. Id at 8. Otherwise, the intervention was "very familiar." Id. at 9.
1982]
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The original version of rule 24 was said by one roughly contemporaneous
writer to do "little more than integrate the practice which had grown
up under Equity Rule 37.127 Equity Rule 37 was couched in discretionary
language, 8 but judicial gloss had created two situations where a denial
of intervention was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law;' in effect,
these situations created an absolute right to intervene. The distinction
in the original rule 24 between intervention of right and permissive in-
tervention was an attempt at a codification of the decisional law that had
regulated intervention under the former Equity Rule 373 o Thus, where
a nonparty was not already adequately represented and could be "bound
by a judgment in the action," or where a nonparty might be adversely
affected by a disposition of property in the control of the court, he could,
under the original rule 24(a) as under Equity Rule 37, intervene as of
right." If these criteria were not met, but the nonparty would present
a question of law or fact in common with the main action, he could in-
tervene, at the discretion of the court, under rule 24(b) permissive
intervention.32
It may have been unwise to attempt to codify a rather ill-defined set
of circumstances which created an absolute right to intervene.' The case
I Campbell, supra note 8, at 1. The Advisory Committee stated that the original rule
24 "amplifies and restates the present federal practice ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory
committee note (1937), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. tit. IV (1976).
Intervention was addressed quite succinctly: "Anyone claiming an interest in the litiga-
tion may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention . Equity R.
37, 226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912) (emphasis added).
' The first situation was where the intervenor claimed an interest in property in the
control of the court. E.g., Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U.S. 311 (1900);
Demulso Corp. v. Tretolite Co., 74 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1934). The second situation was where
the intervenor would be bound by a judgment, but was not already adequately represented.
E.g., Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 218 F. 336 (2d Cir. 1914). In both situa-
tions the question arose in the context of an appeal from a denial of intervention. The
general view was that because of the discretionary nature of intervention no appeal could
be taken from such a denial unless the applicant claimed an interest in property in court
control, or would be bound by a judgment; the latter two situations allowed an appeal,
since a denial of intervention under these circumstances was an abuse of discretion. The
bound-by-a-judgment requirement apparently referred to the situtation where the appli-
cant would be bound by res judicata, and yet his representation was inadequate by virtue
of collusion, an adverse interest, or the general dereliction of the duty of representation.
Moore & Levi, supra note 22, at 591-95. For the subsequent history of this branch of in-
tervention of right, see infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
11 Compare supra note 29 (practice under Equity Rule 30) with infra text accompanying
note 31 (practice under original rule 24(a)). The original version of rule 24 also provided
for intervention of right where a statute unconditionally conferred that right. Permissive
intervention was allowed upon a statutory conditional right to intervene, or where a question
of law or fact in common with the main action would be presented. FED. R. Civ. P. 24
(original version in 308 U.S. 690-91 (1939)).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 308 U.S. 690-61 (1939) (amended 1966).
32 See supra note 30.
The Advisory Committee Notes did not add any content to the language, apart from
its reference to prior federal practice. See supra note 27.
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law that the original rule 24(a) was built upon was interpreting a
discretionary intervention practice.' These decisions actually concerned
only the appealability of a denial of intervention, on the ground of abuse
of discretion." Only functionally, not theoretically, was there a right to
intervene in any situation. To a degree the eventual confusion over rule
24(a)36 stemmed from the uncertain nature of the law" which was incor-
porated into that rule.
This confusion stemmed from the phrase "bound by a judgment." Even
in intervention practice under Equity Rule 37 there was uncertainty as
to in what sense an intervenor had to be bound in order to create a right
of intervention. 8 Courts interpreting the phrase "bound by a judgment"
under the original rule 24(a)(2) split over its construction. 9 The majority
held that an intervenor must show the possibility that he would be bound
in a res judicata sense by a judgment;0 a not insubstantial minority
thought this narrow reading was overly restrictive, and held "bound" to
mean the disabling effect of stare decisis,4' or simply a substantial
impairment of the ability to protect an interest.4 Eventually, the narrower
view triumphed, in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States.4 3
This development would not have been so important but for other
developments in the law of res judicata. In Hansberry v. Lee44 the United
84 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29.
See infra notes 3847 and accompanying text.
See, e.g.,Wham, Intervention in Federal Equity Cases, 17 A.B.A. J. 160, 160 (1931) ("Few
fields of jurisprudence are less understood or are the source of more conflict and confusion
than that of intervention.").
I Cases on this question from prior to the adoption of the rules are typically opaque.
See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, RI. & P.R.R., 218 F. 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1914) ("There
is a class of cases where the claimant's rights are finally disposed of and intervention is
necessary for their protection, in which the right to intervent is absolute .... It is not
always easy to draw the line."). See also Moore & Levi, supra note 22, at 591 (similarly
unclear statement). This fudging of the applicable rule continued after the adoption of the
rules. Note, Intervention and the Meaning of "Bound" Under Federal Rule 24(a)(2), 63 YALE
L.J. 408, 410 (1954).
"9 See supra note 38.
" E.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Archer v. United States,
268 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1959); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 918 (1956); Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
" F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.19, at 502-03 & n.9 (1965).
42 E.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros.,
249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953). The then Circuit
Judge Blackman said "bound" should be accorded a "utilitarian and realistic interpreta-
tion"; the res judicata meaning was rejected. 278 F.2d at 110.
11 336 U.S. 683 (1961). Although the opinion does not explicitly state that "bound" must
be given a res judicata interpretation, the intendment is clear. Subsequent cases read Sam
Fox Publishing to require a res judicata meaning of "bound." E.g., International Mortgage
& Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 866 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., concurring). C.f.
Atlantic Ref. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (interpreting Sam
Fox Publishing to have chosen the res judicata meaning of "bound," but on the facts present
holding the res judicata tests "inappropriate").
" 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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States Supreme Court held that the class action judgment cannot bind
a nonparty who was not adequately represented, because of due process
requirements." When the res judicata meaning of bound under rule 24(a)(2)
was coupled with this due process principle, this rule became an utterly
nugatory syllogistic snarl. To intervene under rule 24(a)(2) one had to show
both that a "binding" judgment was possible and inadequate
representation.4 6 If an intervenor's representation was adequate he did
not meet the second requirement; if it was inadequate, then he could not
be bound by res judicata because of Hansberry, and therefore the first
requirement could not be met. Thus, rule 24(a)(2) would in theory never
be available; the dual requirements for intervention under the rule were,
in effect, mutually exclusive.
These developments led to the 1966 amendments to rule 24(a)(2)," which
made clear the rule was not to operate in so narrow a fashion.49 The phrase
"'bound' by a judgment" was deleted, and was replaced by the phrase
"so situated that the disposition of the action might as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest" The former rule
24(a)(3), which provided a right of intervention where property was in
the control of the court and the intervenor claimed an interest in it, was
merged into the former rule 24(a)(2).5 In addition to a property basis for
intervention, an interest in the "transaction" that is the subject of the
suit became a ground for intervention.' The inadequate representation
requirement was maintained in the new rule.-
'5 Id. at 45.
" Sam Fox Publishing, 366 U.S. at 688.
" Shreve, supra note 9, at 905. For a discussion of this Kafkaesque state of affairs,
see F. JAMES, supra note 41, at 502-04.
"8 Prior to 1966 few significant changes occurred in rule 24. In 1946 the ground for in-
tervention under rule 24(a)(3), that the intervenor might be adversely affected by a disposi-
tion of "property which is in the custody of the court," was expanded to include situations
where property, though not actually in custodia legis, was nonetheless "subject to the con-
trol or disposition of the court." FED R. Civ. P. 24(a)(3), 329 U.S. 839, 853 (1946). In the same
year rule 24(b) was amended to expressly allow permissive intervention by federal and
state officials and agencies in cases-where a party relied for claim or defense upon a statute,
regulation, or other governmental promulgation. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b), 329 U.S. 839,853 (1946);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee note (1946), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. tit. IV
(1976). In 1963 a minor change was made to conform rule 24(c) to the changes made in
that year to rule 5(a), concerning service of pleadings. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c), 374 U.S. 861,
882 (1962).
" The Advisory Committee stated that the res judicata interpretation might be
"linguistically justified by original Rule 24(a)(2); but it could lead to poor results." Also
the res judicata interpretation "could defeat intervention in some meritorious cases." Finally,
the "deletion of the bound language . . .frees the rule from undue preoccupation with
strict considerations of res judicata." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee note (1966),
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. tit. IV (1976).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
51 Id.
52 Id.
Id. For clarity's sake the relevant changes wrought by the 1966 amendments are set
forth below; additions are italicized deletions are in parentheses.
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The effect of the 1966 amendment was to broaden the class of cases
where intervention of right was available.' Some cases which under the
former rule could meet neither the property requirement of rule 24(a)(3)
nor the bound-by-a-judgment requirement of rule 24(a)(2), could now be
brought as intervention of right under the somewhat amorphous standard
of an interest relating to the transaction that is the subject of the suit.5 5
Thus some cases which formerly could meet only the rule 24(b) permissive
intervention standard of a question of law or fact in common were now
within intervention of right."
This change could have led to a reconsideration of the jurisdictional
requirements of intervention of right and permissive intervention. The
general rule presently held by most cases and commentators, that
permissive intervenors must demonstrate an independent basis of
jurisdiction, ' but intervenors of right may rely on ancillary jurisdiction,'
was also the general rule under the pre-1966 rule 24.1' Since after the
amendment what was formerly a permissive intervention became an in-
tervention of right,5 it would have been logical for some interventions
of right to be inappropriate for ancillary jurisdiction; if an intervention
fact pattern was, prior to the amendment, inappropriate for ancillary
jurisdiction, then the same intervention could not by force of its procedural
reclassification as intervention of right suddenly come within a court's
ancillary jurisdiction.' However, the amendment produced no alteration
in the jurisdictional rule; rather the rigid rule requiring independent
jurisdiction for permissive intervenors, and allowing intervenors of right
(a) Intervention of right .... (2) when the (representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property which is in the custody or subject to the control of the court or an
officer thereof.) applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
' 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 597.
This provision is susceptible to a quite broad interpretation. See, e.g., Cascade Natural
Gas v. El Paso Natural Gas, 386 U.S. 129 (1967). For a discussion of the interpretation
of this provision, see infra notes 231-46 and accompanying text.
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 597-98.
5 See, e.g., Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1954); Berbiglia,
Inc. v. Cheney, 249 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Mo. 1965); Gentry v. Hibernia Bank, 154 F. Supp.
62, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1956). See also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims
in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 44 (1963); Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 906.
1 See, e.g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 945 (1963); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 112-13 (8th Cir. 1960). See also Fraser,
supra note 57; Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 905.
" See sources cited supra notes 57-58.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
11 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 598. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (rules of pro-
cedure not to expand jurisdiction).
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to rely on ancillary jurisdiction, formulated prior to 1966, continued to
be followed.2
Purposes and Goals of Intervention
Intervention allows a nonparty to inject himself into an action, so that
he may protect an interest which could be jeopardized. Thus, one of its
primary purposes is to promote fairness to nonparties. Intervention also
promotes judicial economy by allowing a court to hear a dispute in its
entirety. Yet judicial economy may be done a disservice by a too liberal
use of intervention, since an expansion of the scope of an action raises
the possibility of trial confusion and delay. Finally, the interests of the
original parties must not be forgotten.
The roots of intervention in the Anglo-American legal system lie in
allowing a nonparty to intervene to protect a property interest.3 Some
modern property based interventions have been allowed where property
in only the loosest sense has been present." Under the present rule 24(a)(2)
an endangered interest in a "transaction" the subject of an action creates
a right to intervene.' This gradual expansion of intervention practice
reflects a recognition that fairness to nonparties is a sufficient ground
for intervention, regardless of the presence of property in the custody
of the court.66 This policy of fairness to nonparties is at the core of in-
tervention, at least from a historical perspective. 7
Fairness to nonparties may be of increased importance because of the
complexities of modern society. The integrated economic infrastructure
of today's world often creates widespread effects from a given litigation.'
This phenomenon leads to another policy consideration: judicial efficiency.
To the degree that a given transaction involves and affects a number
of persons or legal entities, the presence of all those so related promotes
economic use of court resources. 9 Intervention not only limits duplicative
62 Goldberg, supra note 4, at 423-24. For a discussion of the 1966 amendment's lack of
impact upon jurisdiction, see infra note 263.
's Moore & Levi, supra note 22, at 569-70.
See, e.g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960) (secret for-
mula and testing procedures for production of ink held to be "property" within meaning
of former rule 24(a)(3)).
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
66 "If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determina-
tion made in an action, he should ... be entitled to intervene, and his right to intervene
should not depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of."
FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee note (1966), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. tit. IV (1976).
6 See generally Moore & Levi, supra note 22, at 567-68 (intervention is the protection
afforded a nonparty "if litigants in a pending action are jeopardizing his interest").
Note, The Challenge of the Mass Trial, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1046, 1046 (1955).
6' For a list of the various concerns that are embodied within judicial efficiency, discussed
in the context of intervention, see Kennedy, supra note 9, at 378 n.178.
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actions, but also provides helpful insights and advocacy."0
But against this must be weighed the possibility that more parties will
lend only confusion, not perspective.' Additional parties may bring in
additional legal or factual issues. Thus, intervention does not in every
case serve the goal of judicial efficiency, and if unchecked could result
in the inefficient administration of justice. In recognition of this problem,
rule 24(b) provides that one factor of the district court's discretion in per-
missive intervention is the possibility of delay. '2 Confusion can lead to
unjust results,7 3 and so fairness, one of the most important policies of
intervention, may be harmed by a too liberal use of intervention.
The problems of confusion and delay will affect the original parties.
Rule 24(b) provides against this by directing the court to protect against
"prejudice [to] the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.""
Traditionally the plaintiff was accorded an almost proprietary interest
in an action at law. 5 To a degree this is still true, as the course of an
action depends largely upon the wishes of the plaintiff, and to a lesser
degree, the defendant. The original parties raise the issues, assert claims,
and join parties. 6 Recognizing this, intervention practice should at the
very least be wary of unfairness to the original parties. A plaintiff no
longer owns his action, but he does have a substantial interest in it.
Generally, intervention practice ought to strike a balance between the
interests delineated above." Against the many devices original parties
have to control the course of a litigation, intervention stands as a protec-
tion to nonparties, who may have a very good reason to be concerned
with pending litigation. Fairness to both parties and nonparties must be
weighed, along with the practical limitations of a federal district court.
To the degree that these policies may all be served, intervention is a
useful procedural tool. 8 A logical approach would be to allow intervention
to anyone capable of showing that one of these policies is served, and
,0 Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670, 678 (W.D. Mich. 1980); United States v. Local 638,
Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7" Note, supra note 68, at 104647.
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
7 Note, supra note 68, at 1046.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
11 Campbell, supra note 8, at 3.
71 Moore & Levi, supra note 22, at 567-68.
" Professor Kennedy attempts to formulate general guidelines for the proper use of
intervention. He concludes that the "maximization of all interest" is the ultimate goal. Ken-
nedy, supra note 9, at 331. See also Note, supra note 68.
71 It should be noted that these policies overlap with the policies behind ancillary jurisdic-
tion. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text. It would appear that the policy of fairness
to nonparties is primarily addressed by intervention of right, and that the policy of
convenience is best associated with permissive intervention. In a better system than the
current one the possibility of confusion or delay would be considered in any intervention.
See generally Shreve, supra note 9 (proposing abolition of intervention of right).
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to vest much discretion in the trial court to limit or deny intervention
when the other policies present outweigh a full participation by the
applying nonparty."9
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION"
Early Cases
A discussion of ancillary jurisdiction must start with Freeman v. Howe.'
The United States Supreme Court held in Freeman that once a federal
court took property into its custody, no state court could interfere with
the property; that is, any state court process or decree as to property
in the custody of a federal court would be a nullity.8" Further, a federal
court would hear claims to property in its custody regardless of apparent
jurisdictional impediments.' The latter conclusion, as to a federal court's
jurisdiction over ancillary claims, was a necessary corollary to the former
ruling on the exclusive power of a federal court to deal with property
in its custody. If a state court could not interfere with the property, then
it became necessary for a federal court to hear all claims to the property
regardless of express jurisdictional limits; to hold otherwise would deny
any chance for a claimant falling without the express jurisdiction" of the
federal courts to assert his claim in any forum.' Thus, ancillary jurisdiction
is commonly thought to be a doctrine born of necessity, which was initially
used only in the rare case where it could not be avoided.86
However, other early cases reveal that ancillary jurisdiction had other
uses apart from federal court custody of property. These cases show that
convenience, as well as necessity, was a basis for the invocation of ancillary
jurisdiction.87 Ancillary jurisdiction may be categorized as a doctrine of
convenience in these cases because the ancillary claim heard by the federal
court could have been brought in a state court.
"' Professor Shreve advocates a similar approach, although the formulation differs. He
argues that nonstatutory intervention of right should be abolished, and a variable and discre-
tionary intervention practice should be installed. The decision on each application for in-
tervention should be made "according to how essential procedural values might best be
served." Shreve, supra note 9, at 935. The "procedural values" referred to are fairoiess,
expeditiousness, equal accessibility to the procedural mechanism in question, and the value
of "presenting a sufficiently unobstructed view of the rights of the parties so that the
court can decide fairly the merits of the case." Id. at 907 Cf. infra notes 254-62 and accom-
panying test.
' A full treatment of ancillary jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this note. What follows
is a historical sketch of the doctrine, and a summary of current thinking on the subject.
81 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 460.
For a discussion of the terminology employed in this note see supra note 21.
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 281 (1884).
Minahan, supra note 20, at 281.
See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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A good example of this line of cases is Root v. Woolworth.' A federal
court was held to have jurisdiction to enjoin a nondiverse defendant from
asserting any title to property previously adjudicated by a federal court
to have belonged to the plaintiff." Although the case concerned property,
the legal issue was the efficacy of a prior federal judgment. Entertaining
this claim under the auspices of ancillary jurisdiction was in no way
necessary in the same sense that it was necessary to entertain the claim
in Freeman. The plaintiff could have made use of the prior federal decree
in the state court;9° there was, strictly speaking, no necessity for a federal
court to hear this claim.9'
The situations where ancillary jurisdiction was available at this time
were said to be "(1) To aid, enjoin, or regulate the original suit; (2) to
restrain, avoid, explain, or enforce the judgment or decree therein; (3)
or to enforce or obtain an adjudication of liens upon or claims to the
property in the custody of the court in the original suit. '9 2 It is apparent
that ancillary jurisdiction was not always a matter of strict necessity;
the first two situations above pertain to the Root type of convenient
ancillary jurisdiction; only the last refers to the strictly necessary,
Freeman type of ancillary jurisdiction.
Any doubt about convenience alone being a sufficient basis for the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was set aside by Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange." Moore had sought injunctive relief against the cotton exchange
for an alleged violation of federal antitrust law.94 The Cotton Exchange
counterclaimed, seeking injunctive relief against Moore on a state law
claim.'5 The courts below had dismissed Moore's claim for a failure to
150 U.S. 401 (1893).
Id. at 403, 413. For the sake of accuracy it should be noted that the plaintiff had
purchased the land from the party adjudicated to have had title in the first action.
" The plaintiff could have sued in ejectment. Minahan, supra note 20, at 287 n.42. There
was no more doubt about this at the time of Root than there is now. See, e.g., Embry v.
Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1882); H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 520 (1891).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 43 (1980) (current view on preclusive
effect of judgment concerning ownership of land). Although it has long been recognized
that federal judgments must be honored in state courts, the exact legal basis for this
proposition "has been a matter of considerable uncertainty." Id. § 87 comment a. One view
is that the requirement flows from the ultimate source of federal judicial power, article
III. Id. Alternatively, federal judgments may be within the scope of article VI (supremacy
clause). Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671, 676 (1893); Embry, 107 U.S. at 9. In addition,
acts of Congress effectuating the full faith and credit clause have been read to also com-
mand state courts to honor federal judgments. Metcalf, 153 U.S. at 676; Embry, 107 U.S.
at 9; Hall v. Hall, 238 Md. 191, 194 n.1, 208 A.2d 593, 595 n.1 (1965). See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1976) (current provision effectuating full faith and credit clause).
"I For a discussion of Root v. Woolworth and similar cases, see Minahan, supra note 20,
at 285-87.
1 Loy v. Alston, 172 F. 90, 94-95 (8th Cir. 1909); Brun v. Mann, 151 F. 145, 150 (8th
Cir. 1906); Campbell v. Golden Cycle Mining, 141 F. 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1905).
270 U.S. 593 (1926).
Id. at 602, 603. The alleged violation stemmed from the refusal of the cotton exchange
to provide cotton price quotations to Moore.
11 Id at 603. The counterclaim charged that Moore was "purloining" the price quotations.
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state a violation of antitrust law, and had granted the injunction sought
in the counterclaim.
9 6
Before the United States Supreme Court, Moore argued that the
dismissal of his federal claim deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction
over the state law counterclaim97 The question of whether a dismissal
on the merits can deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction was then,
and is now, easily answered in the negative. The separate question of
why a federal court had jurisdiction over a state law counterclaim in the
first place was apparently not put to the Court,9 nor did the Court go
out of its way to provide an answer. However, the opinion speaks of a
"logical relationship" between the federal and state claims: 10 "it needs
only the failure of the former to establish a foundation for the latter.'. 1
Although Moore did not establish clear guidelines as to the limits of
ancillary jurisdiction,' it did establish that federal courts may exercise
ancillary jurisdiction to serve convenience,0 3 if there is some type of
"logical relationship" between the federal and nonfederal claims. The New
York Cotton Exchange could have obtained injunctive relief separately
in a state court;'" the federal courts could have disposed of the federal
antitrust claim without resolving the nonfederal counterclaim.' In short,
there was no necessity involved. Despite the lack of clarity in Moore,1
6
96 Id.
" Brief for Appellant at 36, Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
" Moore, 270 U.S. .at 607-09. See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1948) (district court
erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction, where complaint stated a federal question,
even though it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted; rather, the court
should have asserted jurisdiction and dismissed on the merits); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238, 247-48 (1933). To hold otherwise would allow the strange result of a dismissal other
than on the merits after having actually considered the merits. The question is an easy
one because it is a fundamental tenet of jurisdiction that a court either has or lacks jurisdic-
tion at the outset of a case; subsequent events cannot alter jurisdiction. Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 3 (1834; Mollan v. Torrance,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) ("[The jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state
of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted
by subsequent events."). Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877) (same principle applies
in context of personal jurisdiction; court must attach property at outset of suit to secure
in rem jurisdiction).
" Brief for Appellant at 34-37, Moore v. New York Cotton Exch, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
Moore argued that the counterclaim was permissive, not compulsory, under Equity Rule
30. Id. at 36. Prior law held that permissive counterclaims under this rule needed independ-
ent jurisdiction. Cleveland Eng'g. v. Galion Dynamic Motor Truck, 243 F. 405, 407 (N.D.
Ohio 1917). The Court in Moore found the counterclaim to be compulsory, 270 U.S. at 609,
but did not go on to explain why a compulsory counterclaim could be heard absent in-
dependent jurisdiction, while a permissive counterclaim could not be. See Shulman & Jaeger-
man, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 412 (1936).
" Moore, 270 U.S. at 610.
101 Id.
[02 See supra, notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
113 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 64.
'" Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 HARV. L. REV. 968, 971 (1951).
105 Id.
10" Shulman & Jaegerman, supra note 99 at 412-14; Note, supra note 104, at 971; Minahan,
supra note 20, at 298-99.
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it has served as the foundation for modern uses of ancillary jurisdiction."'
This case defined the requirements of ancillary jurisdiction only in the
vague phrase of "logical relationship."'' 8 It became the task of subsequent
cases to determine what kind of logical relationship was actually required
to invoke ancillary jurisdiction. °9
Hum v. Oursler" attempted to define with more precision the cir-
cumstances under which a nonfederal claim could be added to a federal
claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction."' The plaintiff had
brought three claims, a federal copyright claim, a state unfair competition
claim stemming from the same copyrighted material, and another state
law unfair competition claim based on a revised, uncopyrighted version
of the copyrighted material."'
The United States Supreme Court formulated a "cause of action" test:
were the federal and nonfederal claims "two distinct grounds in support
of a single cause of action . . . only one of which presents a federal
question," or were they "two separate and distinct causes of action ...
only one of which is federal in character"?" If the federal and nonfederal
claims were the former, then there was federal jurisdiction to hear them
both, as they constituted but a single "cause of action.""' If the two claims
fell into the latter category, then the nonfederal claim was beyond federal
jurisdiction."'
The facts of Hum fit neatly into this scheme. The federal and nonfederal
claims as to the copyrighted material were two grounds in support of
a single cause of action, and therefore there was jurisdiction to hear the
nonfederal claim stemming from the copyrighted material."' But the
nonfederal claim based on uncopyrighted material was a "separate and
distinct cause of action" from the federal copyright infringement claim;
hence, there was no jurisdiction over that claim."7 The cause of action
test laid out in Hum was not so easily applied to other fact patterns,"'
but it was, at least, a test, a limiting principle. A test, even a bad one,
was perhaps better than the opacity of Moore."'
The point to be taken from this brief sketch is that while ancillary
jurisdiction may in a sense have been born of necessity, 2' it has long been
"0 Minahan, supra note 20, at 299.
See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 110-79 and accompanying text.
"' 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
111 On the similarity of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, see supra note 21.
"' Hum, 289 U.S. at 239, 248.
Id. at 246.
11 Id.
1' Id.
118 Id.
... Id. at 248.
"' See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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used to serve the ends of convenience and judicial economy. ' Even in
cases such as Freeman v. Howe, 2 where ancillary jurisdiction was truly
necessary to protect the integrity of the federal courts," a policy of
fairness to those whose claims fell outside normal federal jurisdiction was
surely present.2 4 As the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction matured, it
became clear that convenience was a sufficient basis for its exercise."
But with expansion came concerns for some limiting principle to assure
that ancillary jurisdiction would not become a burden to the federal courts
or an offense to traditional notions of federalism. 28 This cycle of expansion
and limitation by definition would be repeated some forty years later."
Current Status of Ancillary Jurisdiction
The Hum, cause of action test led to a good deal of confusion." The
phrase "cause of action" has always been a troublesome one," and its
use in the area of pendent jurisidiction caused divergent results."
Dissatisfaction with the Hum test led to UMW v. Gibbs"' which took an
expansive view of federal jurisdction."' But just over a decade after Gibbs
came Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger," which, like Hum, at-
tempted to define and limit the power of federal courts to hear claims
falling outside their express jurisdiction."4 Thus, the cycle of expansion
and limitation repeated itself."'
The plaintiff in Gibbs alleged a violation of federal labor law,"' to which
was appended a state law tort claim. 3' After discussing the Hum cause
of action test,"8 and noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 had
done away with the notion of distinct causes of action,"39 the Supreme
12 See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
II 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
' See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
124 Minahan, supra note 20, at 285.
See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
,2 See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 131-35, 154-58 and accompanying text.
12 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
1 At the time of Hum the phrase had an unsettled meaning. See, e.g., Clark, The Code
Cause of Action, 33 YALE LJ. 817 (1924); Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition"of the "Cause of
Action"?, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (1933).
13 The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 222 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
The Supreme Court Term]; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV.
657, 659 (1968).
131 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
' See infra notes 14042 and accompanying text.
11 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
,34 See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
136 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976).
13, Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717-18.
' Id, at 722.
139 Id. at 724.
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Court stated that the previous approach to this problem had been "un-
necessarily grudging."'140 Rather, there is "judicial power" if the relation-
ship between the federal and nonfederal claim permits the conclusion that
the entire action comprises but one constitutional case."' Specifically, if
the two claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," and
the claims are such that one would ordinarily expect them to be tried
in a single proceeding, then "there is power in the federal courts to hear
the whole."'4
The Supreme Court was careful to distinguish between constitutional
power under article III, section 2, and the discretionary exercise of that
power.1 43 If there is constitutional power, because of a common nucleus
of operative fact,'" then the federal courts may exercise that power if
underlying policies of jurisdiction are served."4 A federal court is to
consider the factors of judicial economy,1 40 convenience, and fairness to
the litigants,4 ' the degree to which a federal court will be deciding state
law issues 4 or the degree to which the state claim is closely tied to a
federal policy,"4 and the possibility of jury confusion." This approach is
clearly pragmatic, 1m meeting squarely the policy questions involved in the
extension of federal jurisdiction beyond its express bounds; '52 it is in clear
distinction to the somewhat metaphysical approach of Hurn.'"
The Court did not go long without attempting to check the tendency
toward expanding federal jurisdiction that was present in Gibbs.14
Kroger,1 5 along with Aldinger v. Howard-" and Zahn v. International
Paper, ,7 brought into the analysis of ancillary jurisdiction the considera-
tion of statutory, as well as constitutional, limits on jurisdiction.1 " Prior
to these cases most of the focus had been on constitutional limits,. 9 but
"I Id. at 725.
14 Id.
142 Id.
"I Id. at 726.
14 Id. at 725.
"I Id. at 726.
146 Id.
147 Id.
"' Id. at 726-27.
" Id. at 727.
"o Id.
, One facet of the Gibbs test is whether "a plaintiffs claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Id. at 725.
1'2 See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
11 Shulman & Jaegerman, supra note 99, at 397, 399-400; The Supreme Court Term supra
note 130, at 222.
,- See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
' 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
11 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
117 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
"I See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
15, Comment, Federal Practice-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Ancillary Jurisdiction
and Third Party Practice, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. ! v. 396, 403-04 (1979).
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now congressionally imposed limitations will also be a necessary part of
an ancillary jurisdiction analysis.
Kroger involved a claim by the plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party
defendant, who had been impleaded by the original defendant.16 Jurisdic-
tion for the claim against the original defendant had been based upon
diversity of citizenship."' The circuit courts had split upon the issue of
whether a plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse third party defendant
could appropriately fall within a federal court's ancillary jurisdiction.162
The Supreme Court held that such a claim was beyond the scope of
ancillary jurisdiction.61 It assumed without deciding that Gibbs' common
nucleus of operative fact test was the correct standard for determining
constitutional power in the diversity context as well as in federal question
cases.164 But the analysis did not stop with a determination of constitu-
tional power; relying on Aldinger61 and Zahn,'66 the Court concluded that
statutory limits on federal jurisdiction also must be considered.67 In the
diversity context Congress had impliedly adopted the longstanding judicial
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction statutes requiring complete
diversity." Thus, even if an ancillary claim meets the assumed constitu-
tional standard of deriving from a common nucleus of operative fact, it
still must not offend a relevant statutory requirement such as complete
diversity.'69
An ancillary claim may overcome the complete diversity requirement
if it is "logically dependent" upon a resolution of the initial, jurisdiction
conferring claim;70 that is, a resolution of the original claim would be
necessary to decide the ancillary claim.' In addition, the party relying
on ancillary jurisdiction must be in a defensive posture, "haled into court
against his will."'7 2 If an ancillary claim in diversity meets the constitu-
Kroger, 437 U.S. at 367-69.
161 Id. at 367.
162 Id. Earlier cases had established that the impleader of a third-party defendant fell
within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201
F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944). Likewise,
a third-party defendant's counterclaim against the original plaintiff had been held to be
within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. Revere Copper & Brass v. Aetna & Sur., 426
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
.. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376-77.
'6 Id. at 371 n.10. Read in context, this means that the Gibbs test is assumed to apply
to ancillary jurisdiction, as well as to pendent jurisdiction. See generally supra note 21.
161 Aldinger, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (construing the statutory limits in 28 U.S.C. S 1343(3) (1976)).
16 Zahn, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (construing the statutory limits in 28 U.S.C. 5 1332(a) (1976)).
16, Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372.
16. Id. at 373-74. The statutory construction of the majority's opinion was, to say the
least, strained. Id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 372.
171 Id. at 376.
11 There is support for this proposition in Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S.
593 (1926). See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
177 Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
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tional power requirement of Gibbs, and is "logically dependent" upon the
initial claim, and is asserted in a defensive posture, then and only then
may it be asserted notwithstanding a lack of complete diversity.17 3
The Supreme Court suggested examples of the proper use of ancillary
jurisdiction in diversity: impleader, complusory counterclaims, cross-claims,
and intervention of right. 4 In all these, there is the requisite logical
dependence and defensive posture.' But here, plaintiff Kroger was
asserting an "entirely separate" claim, '7 not a logically dependent one,
and had chosen the federal forum, thus lacking a defensive posture. 177
Accordingly, her claim against the nondiverse third-party defendant could
not be allowed in light of the congressional jurisdictional limits preseni.18
Thus the current scope of ancillary jurisdiction turns not only on the
constitutional power of a federal court to hear a nonfederal claim, but
also on statutory limits which may expressly or impliedly further delineate
federal jurisdictional power. " Having surveyed the current thinking on
ancillary jurisdiction the analysis can now move to the issue: whether,
and under what circumstances, a permissive intervenor may rely on an-
cillary jurisdiction.
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND PERMISSIVE INTERVENORS
The Problem
The general rule on jurisdiction as to intervenors of right, that they
need not show an independent basis of jurisdiction, 8' is not challenged
here; because of the nature of rule 24(a), every intervention of right is
necessarily within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. s' What is challenged
" Id.
" Id. at 375-76 & n.18. The Court merely noted cases allowing ancillary jurisdiction in
these situations, without expressly sanctioning them.
'1 The defensive posture requirement is met by these devices, as none of them is im-
plemented by the party choosing the forum. In impleader, logical dependence is necessarily
present since the third-party defendant must be one who may be liable to the original
defendant, if the defendant is liable to the original plaintiff; thus, the third-party claim
depends upon a resolution of the original claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 14. Similarly, since a com-
pulsory counterclaim must arise out of the same "transaction or occurrence" as the plain-
tiffs claim, in most cases such a counterclaim will be dependent upon the resolution of
the initial claim; the claim and counterclaim will usually yield mutually exclusive results.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). It is not so clear that intervention of right or cross-claims will in all cases
meet the logical dependence requirement. See infra note 181.
178 Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
"T Id.
1 Id. at 377.
" See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 7 and accompanying text. This is true because under rule 24(a)(2) the
intervenor must claim an "interest" in either the "property or transaction" that is the
subject of the action. If intervention is based on property, then ancillary jurisdiction is
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is the rule that permissive intervenors may never rely on ancillary
jurisdiction.182 Under the present reading of rule 24(a), there are in-
tervenors who cannot meet the criteria for intervention of right, but who,
as permissive intervenors under rule 24(b), can appropriately be within
a court's ancillary jurisdiction.'3 Under a narrower reading of rule 24(a)
more intervenors would fall within the class of permissive intervention;"
if this movement of the procedural classifications of intervenors were
coupled with a recognition that permissive intervenors are in some cases
within ancillary jurisdiction, important policies would be served." These
issues are discussed below.
Rule 82
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides in part: "These rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts or the venue of actions therein."'86 Despite the presence
of rule 82, many of the procedural devices of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, when coupled with ancillary jurisdiction, result in federal courts
hearing claims beyond their express jurisdiction." If rule 82 is a stumbling
block to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over permissive intervenors,
then it is a curious fact that it has not impeded the use of ancillary jurisdic-
tion over compulsory counterclaims,1" impleaded defendants," or interven-
tion of right." Rule 82 applies to all of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and so, if in the abstract applying ancillary jurisdiction to
permissive intervenors would violate rule 82, then a similar application
to other procedural mechanisms for joinder also would violate rule 82.
In short, rule 24(a) on intervention of right can no more extend jurisdic-
tion than rule 24(b) on permissive intervention, and yet ancillary jurisdic-
tion is allowed to the former. 91
clearly available even under the doctrine of a century ago. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S.(24 How.) 450 (1860) (discussed in text accompanying notes 81-84 supra). If a transaction
is the basis for intervention, then an interest therein by the intervenor would satisfy the
common nucleus of operative fact test. Compare infra text accompanying note 211 with
supra text accompanying note 142. In any intervention there is the defensive posture
necessary to overcome the complete diversity requirement. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text. The logical dependence requirement in diversity might not always be
met, but apparently the Court in Kroger, 387 U.S. 365 (1978), thought that its decision would
affect intervention of right. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 202-25 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
... Baker, supra note 21, at 762.
'" See supra note 162.
189 Id.
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670, 681 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
[Vol. 58:111
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
This point is nicely illustrated by an exception to the general rule, which
allows permissive intervention by class members into class actions without
independent jurisdiction.192 Where the number of people who present a
common question of law or fact are so numerous as to constitute a class,
convenience and economy are served by allowing intervention over
jurisdictional objections. There should be no objection to the exception
made for class actions. The objection, and the point to be taken, is that
the same analysis ought to apply to all permissive interventions.193 Rule
82 applies whether the intervention is sought in a class action or in a
two-party litigation. If rule 82 is not offended by such intervention in
class actions, it is hard to see why it would be in other contexts. The
ultimate jurisdictional question remains. The point is that rule 82 does
not provide an answer; it merely asks a necessary question.
One reason that rule 82 does not bar the use of ancillary jurisdiction
is that there really is no expansion of jurisdiction when a procedural rule
and ancillary jurisdiction operate to allow a federal court to hear a
nonfederal claim.' Ancillary jurisdiction considerably predates the rules,195
and so the invocation of it is not an extension of jurisdiction; rather
ancillary jurisdiction may be likened to a reservoir, a latent source of
judicial power, which procedural rules merely tap. As Judge Clark has
put it:
[Jjurisdiction is not extended by mere devices making possible more
complete adjudication of issues in a single case, when based upon
jztrisdictional principles of long standing, even though the effectiveness
of the new devices makes their use more frequent. Obviously, a mere
broadening of the content of a single federal action must not be
confused with the extension of federal power.'
A related point is that rule 82 also provides that the rules are not to
limit jurisdiction. 97 Hence, rule 82 must be read to mean that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "did not freeze the jurisdiction [of federal courts]
at the point at which it stood in 1938 any more than it expanded it. The
question of jurisdiction, while free of any compulsion from the rules, is
as much a subject . . . of judicial reconsideration as ever."19
'1 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921); H. HART, H. WECHSLER,
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHsLEs'S THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1078 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 595.
19 See United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
("[A]lthough this is not a 'class action,' the reasons of policy which permit an exception
[to the general jurisdictional rules of intervention] in such cases also apply here.").
1" 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE S 3523, at 64
(1975).
', See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944) (emphasis added).
19 FED. R. CIw. P. 82.
*" 7 J. MOORE, supra note 5, 82.02(1), at 82-6 to -7.
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Thus, there are two responses to the contention that rule 82 bars per-
missive intervenors from utilizing ancillary jurisdiction. First, rule 82 is
not offended by this use of ancillary jurisdiction because there is no ex-
pansion of federal jurisdiction occurring, but merely the further exercise
of previously held jurisdictional power. Second, rule 82 only prohibits
jurisdictional expansion by operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, whereas if this use of ancillary jurisdiction does not expand federal
jurisdiction, it is effected by judicial reconsideration of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, not by force of rule 24(b). 9 To invoke rule 82 as a barrier to allow-
ing permissive intervenors to use ancillary jurisdiction is to beg the ques-
tion. 20 What must be addressed is whether the contours of rule 24(b)
are such that it is never possible for a permissive intervenor to come
within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. If there is exact conformity be-
tween the class of permissive intervenors and the cases where ancillary
jurisdiction is not appropriate, then the general rule is correct;'0 ' if other-
wise, then each permissive intervention must be examined to determine
if ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate.
Circumstances Where Ancillary Jurisdiction is Appropriate
for Permissive Intervenors
There are three requirements for the nonstatutory intervention of right
under rule 24(a)(2): the intervenor must have an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action; that interest
might be practically impaired by a disposition of the action; and the in-
terest must not be adequately represented by existing parties."0 ' If any
one of these three requirements is not met, intervention of right is
unavailable,' but if the applicant would present a question of law or fact
in common with the initial action, permissive intervention may be
available. 0 '
. A third response lies in historical fact: rule 82 has not impeded federal courts from
extending ancillary jurisdiction in other contexts. See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966) (prior approach "unnecessarily grudging"); Revere Copper & Brass v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur., 426 F.2d 709, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (third party defendant's counterclaim
against original plaintiff held within ancillary jurisdiction); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp.,
144 F.2d 968, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1944) (impleader may be supported by ancillary jurisdiction).
' Those espousing the majority view on jurisdiction over permissive intervenors often
offer little more than a knee jerk, reflex citation to rule 82 without a great deal of analysis.
See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 587.
" The problem may be conveniently stated in terms of elementary propositional logic.
If A represents the class of permissive interventions, B represents the class of cases where
ancillary jurisdiction is not allowable, and C represents the general rule that permissive
intervenors may never rely on ancillary jurisdiction, then the truth of proposition C may
be stated as follows: if, and only if, A is entirely a subset of B, then C is true. But if A
is not entirely a subset of B, then not only is C not proven true, it is proven not true.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 75, at 370 (3d ed. 1976).
FED. R. Cry. P. 24(b).
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Under the present reading of these requirements, it is possible for a
case to fall outside rule 24(a) and yet remain within the federal district
court's ancillary jurisdiction. In some cases, where permissive interven-
tion is the nonparty's only access to the action, ancillary jurisdiction is
present. If ancillary jurisdiction is present for an intervenor of any type,
it is because of a nexus between his claim or defense and the principal
action; 5 various phrases have been used in attempts to define this nexus:
"logical relationship,""2 ' the same "cause of action,' 2 7 a "common nucleus
of operative fact,"' or in the case where ancillary jurisdiction would defeat
complete diversity, "logical dependence" coupled with a defensive
posture.0 9 The only requirement of rule 24(a)(2) which addresses the
presence of this nexus, and hence of ancillary jurisdiction, is the require-
ment of an interest in the subject of the action. 10 An intervention of right
is always within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction because the interest
claimed by the intervenor establishes the necessary nexus, or ancillarity
to the initial action."
Therefore, if this interest is present, but intervention of right is
unavailable because the intervenor cannot show inadequate representa-
tion, then he is within the ancillary jurisdiction of the district court as
a permissive intervenor."2 This same intervenor would, under the general
See supra note 181.
= Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
21 Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
11 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978).
210 That inadequacy of representation and impairment of one's ability to protect an in-
terest are not properly relevant to the jurisdictional analysis is illustrated by the excep-
tion for class actions. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Courts and commentators
have properly excluded the procedural requirements of intervention of right from their
analysis of jurisdiction over permissive intervention into class actions, yet they would have
those same procedural requirements bear on the jurisdictional question where the per-
missive intervention is sought into non-class actions. If as a general matter a permissive
intervenor must show inadequacy of representation and a possible impairment of an in-
terest to avail himself of ancillary jurisdiction, then why does not a class member have
to make a similar showing to come within ancillary jurisdiction? The only explanation for
this inconsistency is that the jurisdictional analysis has been muddled by procedural con-
cerns. It is procedurally convenient to allow permissive intervention into class actions,
and so the jurisdictional question is answered independently of procedural policies; it is
not so convenient to allow permissive intervention into all other actions, and so some
authorities carry over these procedural concerns into the jurisdictional analysis: put simply,
jurisdiction is being used as a tool to effectuate procedural concerns. However, clarity of
thought is promoted by maintaining the separate identities of these two very different
problems, and is disserved by running them together.
2" See supra note 181.
21 See Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670 (W.D. Mich. 1980). In an action brought against
an employer by the United States Secretary of Labor seeking a judgment declaing a con-
tract with migrant farm workers to be in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
employees sought to intervene to protect their interest in the employment contract. The
intervenors "offered no showing that their interests are not adequately represented by
their putative co-defendant." Id. at 676. Although there is authority to the contrary, see,
e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 1909, it is generally held that an intervenor
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rule, come within ancillary jurisdiction accorded to intervenors of right
if he could show inadequate representation."'3 But inadequate representa-
tion has nothing to do with ancillary jurisdiction; it does not affect the
degree to which a claim is ancillary to the initial claim. The constitutional
requirement of a common nucleus of operative fact,214 and where statutory
limits are relevant, the test of logical dependence, 1 ' are affected only by
the degree and quality of the intervenor's interest.218 The issue of inade-
quacy of representation is not, and should not be relevant to the presence
of logical dependence or to the broader question of a common nucleus
of operative fact. To adhere to the general rule and deny ancillary jurisdic-
tion to such a permissive intervenor would violate rule 82 by effecting
a limitation on federal jurisdiction based solely on a distinction made by
a procedural rule.' Adequacy of representation goes only to the question
of whether it is procedurally convenient to allow a party a right of in-
tervention. It does not pertain to substantive issues of jurisdiction."8
Similarly, where an otherwise sufficient intervention of right is removed
has at least a minimal burden of proving inadequate representation. Trbovich v. UMW,
404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); Olden v. Hagerstown Cash Registers, 619 F.2d 271, 273 (3d
Cir. 1980); National Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 383 (10th
Cir. 1977); Edmondson v. Nebraska, 383 F.2d 123, 127 (8th Cir. 1967) (inadequacy of represen-
tation "is a necessary element to be proved"); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 5, 24.09-114], at
24-316; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 353-54. Most importantly, the Sixth Circuit has adopted
this view. Blanchard v. Johnson, 532 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869
(1976); Afro Am. Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1974) (applicant
has burden of showing inadequate representation); Piedmont Paper Prod. v. American Fin.
Corp., 89 F.R.D. 41, 44 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("applicant has burden of proof" on inadequate
representation). Accordingly, the court in Usery could not grant intervention of right without
committing reversible error. It nonetheless made a gratuitous finding that, on the basis
of the pleadings, the farmworkers would be "entitled" to intervene of right. Usery, 87 F.R.D.
at 676-77. Still, this is but dicta, as the court ultimately concluded it would "grant" their
motion . . .under Rule 24(b) [permissive intervention]." Id. (emphasis added). The court
found that the "legal claims and underlying facts could not be more closely related to those
of the principle cause." Id. at 681. Accordingly, the intervenors' interest in the litigation
sufficed to provide that there was a "tight nexus," which was sufficient to establish an-
cillary jurisdiction. Id.
213 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
24 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
z See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. The other requirement, of defensive
posture, is present for all intervenors. See supra note 181.
21 A permissive intervenor must present a "question of law or fact" in common with
the initial action. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(b). Thus, some intervenors, particularly where there is
an extensive factual connection to the principal action, would present claims arising from
the same core of operative fact. If statutory limits, such as complete diversity, are present,
the degree of identity of legal questions would determine whether there is the necessary
logical dependence. See Usery, 87 F.R.D. at 680-81 (outcome of intervention dependent upon
initial action, where United States Secretary of Labor sought to nullify contract to which
intervenors were a party; hence, logical dependence met).
211 See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
"1 That is, if a party is adequately represented, then procedurally it would be awkward
and burdensome to allow intervention in all such cases. However, this procedural considera-
tion has no place in an analysis of subject matter jurisdiction. What is jurisdictionally relevant
is the type of nexus present between the initial claim and the intervention.
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from the benefits of rule 24(a)(2) because the disposition of the action would
not impair the applicant's ability to protect that interest, he may intervene
permissively and fall within the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction.219
This is not to say that it is necessarily a good thing in every case to
grant entrance to an action to a party who will not be impaired by its
disposition; rather, in such circumstances a district court is jurisdictionally
competent to hear his claim, providing his interest in the litigation pro-
vides the type of nexus needed for ancillary jurisdiction.220 Impairment
of an interest is not relevant to ancillary jurisdiction, but only to the ques-
tion of whether it is procedurally wise to grant such a party entry to
the suit. The procedural problems presented by an intervenor whose
ability to protect his interests is not being impaired may be dealt with
through the discretionary power of the district courts over permissive
intervenors." Such procedural problems ought not be elevated to the level
of jurisdictional doctrine.
There will, perhaps, be other situations in which ancillary jurisdiction
is appropriate for permissive intervenors. Ancillary jurisdiction, like many
other legal problems, is fact sensitive, and so it is difficult to state a rule
of general applicability to cover all possible variations.' This is the cen-
tral problem with the general rule in this area: it is absolute and unbend-
219 See TPI Corp. v. Merchandise Mart of S.C., 651 F.R.D. 684 (D.S.C. 1974). In a diversity
action the vendor sued vendee for breach of contract. Id. at 686-87. Several business con-
cerns, all part of a single enterprise with the initial defendant, and all involved in the
transaction in one way or another, sought to intervene and assert counterclaims. Id. There
was complete diversity, but several counterclaims were for less than the jurisdictional
amount. Intervention of right was inappropriate because the intervenors could not show
that they would be disabled in protecting their interests. Id. at 688. Permissive interven-
tion was granted. Id. at 692. The court had found that the intervenors' interest in the
transaction would have qualified them for intervention of right. Id. at 687. Ancillary jurisdic-
tion was allowed. Id. at 690, 692. It should be noted that there was both legal and factual
commonality between the original claim and the intervention, that is, whether the ven-
dor's goods were defective such as to breach the contract controlled both. Id. at 686-87.
Accordingly, there was logical dependence present. Compare Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (nonjurisdictional claim needs only failure of jurisdictional
claim to be established) with Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376
(1978) (no logical dependence between claims, and therefore ancillary jurisdiction inappro-
priate in light of statutory limits).
I See supra note 218. The distinction between procedural convenience and jurisdictional
power must be kept in mind.
2 See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 378-79 (ancillary jurisdiction "should be evaluated on
its own rationale and not on the basis of a definitional distinction").
I This is admitted as true even by one who has supported the general rule on jurisdic-
tion over intervenors.
The difficulties presented by the ancillary jurisdiction concept are a problem
for each of the joinder devices ... but nowhere else are the problems as acute
as with intervention under Rule 24. No satisfactory rules have yet been
developed for determining when an intervenor comes within the limits of
ancillary jurisdiction.
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 590.
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ing, but this area is sufficiently murky to require a case by case analysis.'
The focus of the jurisdictional question should be shifted away from the
procedural requirements of intervention of right and back to the real issue:
Is there a sufficient relationship between the intervention and the initial
claim to warrant the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction?"
Proposals for Intervention Practice
A Tale of Two Cases
From the above it is clear that in certain cases ancillary jurisdiction
is appropriate for permissive intervenors. While this conclusion is impor-
tant in itself, if it were coupled with a realignment of intervention of
right and permissive intervention, the entire course of intervention prac-
tice would run more smoothly.22 The distinction between intervenors is
not one found in nature, but rather is a line drawn to effectuate procedural
policies." The 1966 amendments to rule 24 shifted some cases of per-
missive intervention into the category of intervention of right. 8 In addi-
tion, the requirements of rule 24(a)(2) have been broadly construed, fur-
ther expanding the cases where intervention of right is available.'
However, procedural convenience would dictate handling more cases under
the discretionary regime of permissive intervention. 0 This may be
achieved if it is recognized that ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate for
permissive intervenors.
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.2 ' illustrates the
broad construction that has been given rule 24(a)(2). Here a corporation
was allowed to intervene in an antitrust action, to assure that a divestiture
order would restore a natural gas supplier to full competitive status.'
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the intervenor had an
"interest" in the "transaction" that was the subject of the action.' It
delved at length into the substantive terms of the lower court's divestiture
order to find that the United States Justice Department had not ade-
Usery, 87 F.R.D. at 681.
See supra note 222.
See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81
HARV. L. REV. 721,730,752-56 (1968). See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Joinder of Clains,
33 F.R.D. 27, 43 (1963) ("[I]t is not always easy to determine which type of intervention
is involved.").
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
2, 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
Id. at 132-33.
Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135.
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quately represented the intervenors' interests.' A strident dissent found
the interest here "insubstantial,"' 5 and the majority's conclusion of in-
adequate representation by the Justice Department ".wholly unjustified. ''as
In short, the case involved "radical extensions of intervention doctrines"
which "rushed headlong into a jurisprudential quagmire.""
This broad reading of rule 24(a)(2) stands in stark contrast to United
States v. Local 638, Enterprise Association.13" The facts were functionally
similar to those in Cascade. An agency of New York City sought to in-
tervene in an action brought by the United States Justice Department."O
The district court refused intervention of right because there was no
evidence of insufficient representation by the United States Attorney
General," and because it would not stretch the word "transaction" to
include this situation.241 This construction was supported by the policy
considerations present: to allow intervention of right here would open
the door to many more similar interventions, where there was only a
"transaction" in the loosest sense of that word.242 This approach avoided
picking apart the representation afforded by the Justice Department and
the expansion of the normal scope of judicial review that was present
in Cascade.243
The district court did allow permissive intervention" and based it upon
ancillary jurisdiction. 5 The result was the same as in Cascade and in Local
638, Enterprise Association, but the former achieved intervention with
a meat ax, while the latter used the precision of a scalpel. The former
stretched the language of rule 24(a)(2), and the latter maintained the in-
tegrity of that language. By recognizing that ancillary jurisdiction may
be appropriate for permissive intervenors, " the court in Local 638, Enter-
prise Association was able to do justice both to the language of rule 24(a)(2)
and to an intervention which the court thought ought to be before it.
I Id. at 136-42. The Court's view was that the United States Justice Department had
"knuckled under." Id. at 141.
Id. at 154 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2Id.
Id. at 160.
347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 165.
24I Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
2 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
244 Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. at 169.
24 Id.
248 The claim here was properly ancillary because the "legal issues in the federal action
are substantially the same" as the nonfederal claim. Id. at 166. The intervention was "vitally
related" to the main action. Id. at 168. Clearly there was the requisite nexus. Both the
intervenor and the initial plaintiff were governmental units, litigating the legality of the
same allegedly discriminatory practices; both the original and the intervening claim must,
therefore, have arisen from the same core of operative fact. See supra note 216.
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The wisdom of such a reading of rule 24(a)(2), when coupled with the proper
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is set forth below.
Policy Implications of a Strict Reading of Rule 24(a)(2)
Under a liberal reading of the requirements of intervention of right,
there are cases which qualify only for permissive intervention but over
which a federal district court has ancillary jurisdiction.4 ' Contracting the
class of intervenors of right, by a stricter reading of rule 24(a)(2), would
cause a concomitant expansion of the class of permissive intervenors."
The borderline cases, which would fall into the category of permissive
intervention if rule 24(a)(2) were more strictly construed, would present
a clear case for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Under a liberal
reading of rule 24(a)(2) these cases are within intervention of right, and
hence ancillary jurisdiction is available in them. 9 Procedural realignment
would cause the same fact pattern to drop to the level of permissive in-
tervention, but this reclassification would not address jurisdictional
issues.250 It is clear, then, that these permissive intervenors are within
federal ancillary jurisdiction. A stricter adherence to the requirements
for intervention of right, and thus an expansion of the class of permissive
intervenors, would effectuate important policies, if it is recognized that
ancillary jurisdiction is available to certain permissive intervenors.
The Cascade reading of rule 24(a)(2) creates the danger that a multitude
of interventions of right will flow into the federal court system."' The
court in Local 688, Enterprise Association recognizing this danger, opted
for a narrower reading of rule 24(a)(2), and allowed only permissive in-
tervention under rule 24(b).2- In general, intervention practice is better
regulated through the use of discretionary permissive intervention.' This
. See supra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
28 Essentially, this would partially reverse the movement of permissive intervenors into
the class of intervenors of right that was effected by the 1966 amendments to rule 24.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Thus, narrowing the class of intervention
of right would not be a radical step in an uncharted course, but rather a partial reversion
to practice before 1966.
'g See supra notes 5-7, 181 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See also supra note 218.
See Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. at 165.
Id. at 164.
See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
Professor Kennedy argues that the distinction between intervention of right and per-
missive intervention ought to be abolished, and instead only permissive, discretionary in-
tervention should be available. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 375-80. This should be coupled
with an express authorization by rule 24 for the trial judge to utilize his "creative power"
to impose such conditions upon the intervention as are deemed useful. As to jurisdiction,
if "procedural convenience dictates that the intervenor's claim should be tried with the
original controversy, then modern theories of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction should
be used to sustain federal jurisdiction." It should be noted that these procedural policies
apply in both federal question and diversity settings.
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allows a trial court not only to grant or deny entrance altogether, but
also to tailor the degree and type of intervention to the exigencies of
the situation."s This type of variable intervention has been advocated by
Professor Shapiro.
The advantages of variable intervention are present not only in cases
such as Cascade and Local 638, Enterprise Association, where entrance
is sought to an action brought by the government, but in all cases of
intervention.2 7 To implement this proposed change in the volume of in-
tervention of right, it is necessary to recognize that there is no principled
reason for denying ancillary jurisdiction to a permissive intervenor merely
because he is a permissive intervenor. The increase in the use of ancillary
jurisdiction in this context should not be thought to increase the federal
courts' caseload or the amount of energy spent by them. Intervention
and ancillary jurisdiction come into play only after an action within federal
jurisdiction has been initiated; thus, the number of cases does not increase.
It is of course true that, as a practical matter, allowing intervention
increases the amount of judicial energy necessary to resolve a given action.
But increasing the use of ancillary jurisdiction in this context, where
coupled with a transfer of intervenors to the discretionary regime of rule
24(b) permissive intervention, would result in a decrease in the net judicial
effort spent on intervention practice. Use of permissive intervention could
eliminate the time-consuming or wasteful interventions, or make them
more efficient by the imposition of conditions upon the intervention."s
In short, the current scope of intervention of right is too broad, while
the use of ancillary jurisdiction over intervenors is too narrow. Because
of the often-cited general rule that ancillary jurisdiction is never available
to a permissive intervenor, a trial court, to allow intervention at all, must
grant it in the form of intervention of right if the intervenor meets the
requirements of ancillary jurisdiction only; this operates to loosen the
requirements for intervention of right. However, once an intervenor is
"I See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (discretionary language); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 5,
24.17[3.-1], at 24-185 ("the court is able to determine before intervention is allowed ...
whether the intervener proposes to counterclaim or add new parties, and it may then deter-
mine the scope of the intervention which it wishes to allow"); id. at 24-196 ("Where in-
tervention is of right the court literally should have no authority to strike out any
counterclaims the intervener might set up."); id. at 24.17[3.-2] (same rules apply to cross-
claims); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, §§ 1921-1922. See also infra note 259.
2' Shapiro, supra note 227, at 762. See also supra note 254.
25 See supra notes 254, 256 and accompanying text.
The argument could be made that while this note's proposal would be more efficient
for the district courts, the case by case analysis of jurisdiction would create a burden on
the appellate courts. This might be true, at least initially, but the burden would be offset
by the decrease in appellate review required over the initial decision on the intervention
itself. That is, if more cases were handled under permissive intervention, as is advocated,
the scope of judicial review would eventually be narrowed, as many decisions on the in-
tervention question would be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See generally Shreve,
supra note 9.
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allowed in under rule 24(a)(2) he is in all the way. 9 If such cases were
treated under rule 24(b), the court would retain more control over the
course of the litigation, and could better balance the policies of judicial
economy, fairness to nonparties, and fairness to the original parties.2"
Nor would the policy of federalism be offended. If a given intervention
would result in unnecessary decisions of state law, then the intervention
may be denied or limited.
The policies which would determine the scope of a discretionary
intervention dovetail nicely into the underlying policies of ancillary
jurisdiction."' Judicial economy is furthered by free joinder of claims and
parties, which both ancillary jurisdiction and intervention help to imple-
ment. Judicial economy can be hampered by a too liberal use of joinder,
when such devices lead to an unmanageable judicial proceeding, but
ancillary jurisdiction coupled with permissive intervention allows the trial
court to regulate the scope of an action. Ancillary jurisdiction is concerned
with fairness to those not initially involved in the action; intervention
is the mechanism that allows nonparties to become involved. Once in-
tervention is granted, judicial economy is benefited further by lending
more efficacy to a given federal judgment, as the intervenor will be bound
by the judgment. 2' Of the two types of intervention, discretionary in-
tervention is clearly the more attractive and useful because it is better
3B J. MOORE, supra note 5, 24.17(3.-1), at 24-727, 24-741. Although this is true, addi-
tional comment is necessary to understand the status of a party as an intervenor of right.
Because of the mandatory language of rule 24(a), it is fairly clear that once an intervenor
establishes grounds for intervention of right the district court must grant entrance to the
action. See generally Shreve, supra note 9, at 898 n.15. This construction of the plain words
of rule 24(a) should not be confused by the statements of some courts that there is an
element of discretion in making the threshold determination of whether the requirements
of intervention of right have been met. See, e.g., Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1972). The requirement that an intervention be timely sought is subject to a
particularly discretionary finding. See, e.g., NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973);
Smith Petroleum Serv. v. Monsanto Chem., 420 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1970); Diaz v.
Southern Drilling, 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th Cir. 1970). The hard question is whether an
intervenor of right may be precluded from raising new issues or adding new parties. It
would seem strange that a party having a right to intervene may nonetheless lack the
ability to effectuate that right fully. The better reasoned view is that an intevenor of right
may counterclaim, cross-claim, or bring in a third-party defendant, assuming there is jurisdic-
tion to do so (this jurisdiction, over the intervenor's new claims or added parties, must
not be confused with jurisdiction over the intervention itself). See 3B J. MOORE, supra note
5, 24.17[3]. Shapiro takes a narrower view on this question; only those issues which are
related to the initial claim may be raised by an intervenor. Shapiro, supra note 227, at
754-55. A strong argument in Moore's favor is that intervention under the former Equity
Rule 37 was always to be "in subordination to" the main action, from which it may be
inferred that an intervenor's claims were to be similarly subordinate. The lack of any such
limitation in the language of the present rule 24, along with the broad language of rule
13, indicate that an intervenor of right may avail himself of all the procedural perogatives
of an original party. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, SS 1921-1922.
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
Z Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 905.
Local 638, Enter. Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. at 168.
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equipped to balance all the interests present. For these reasons policy
strongly indicates that ancillary jurisdiction should be available in certain
cases to permissive intervenors,"s in order that a larger proportion of
interventions may be handled under the discretion of permissive
intervention.
CONCLUSION
While the generally accepted rule as to the jurisdictional requirements
for intervention is that intervenors of right may rely on ancillary jurisdic-
tion and need not show an independent basis of jurisdiction, but permissive
intervenors may never rely on ancillary jurisdiction, there is no principled
reason for imposing this arbitrary distinction. The requirements of in-
tervention of right are meant only to delineate under what circumstances
it is procedurally convenient to grant a right of intervention. The question
of ancillary jurisdiction is entirely separate from this procedural distinc-
tion. Therefore, each permissive intervention should be examined in-
dividually, and ancillary jurisdiction granted on a case-by-case basis. In
addition, if it is recognized that ancillary jurisdiction is sometimes
appropriate for permissive intervenors, then the scope of intervention
of right may be narrowed. Such an adjustment would smooth the entire
course of intervention practice.
JEFFREY L. RENSBERGER
A contrary argument can be made that the distinction between the two types of inter-
venors is a convenient place to draw the jurisdictional line. Under the general rule one
need only determine whether a given intervention is permissive or of right, and then the
jurisdictional problems are solved as well. Professor Wright is one advocate of this "bright
line" theory of intervention jurisdiction. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 598-99.
It is hard to explain the fact that the shifting of some permissive intervenors into the
class of intervention of right, which was effected by the 1966 amendments to rule 24, See
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text, did not cause a reconsideration of the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the two types of intervention, see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying
text, without supposing that the federal courts have been deciding jurisdiction over inter-
vention on the basis of a "bright line" both before and after 1966. Professor Wright ex-
plains the lack of judicial consideration of the jurisdictional impact of the 1966 amend-
ments to rule 24 by facilely concluding that the pre-1966 jurisdictional views were "too
narrowly confined." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 598. No doubt jurisdictional
tests should be "bright lines," as should all rules of law. But the jurisdictional test for
intervenors, under the general rule, is no brighter than the test for determining which
type of intervention is present, and the requirements of rule 24 are by no means simple
and easy to apply. See supra notes 55 and accompanying text. Further, a "bright line"
as to the jurisdiction over intervenors, should still be a jurisdictional test, not a procedural
one. Basing the jurisdictional test on the contours of rule 24, for mere procedural convenience
and not because of any jurisdictional analysis, clearly offends FED. R. CIv. P. 82; the effect
is to allow a procedural rule, rule 24, to limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court decisions on ancillary jurisdiction in general
do not appear to draw any "bright line," with the possible exception of Hurn v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 239 (1933), which was a failure. See supra notes 93-178 and accompanying text.
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